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Abstract
A key factor in developing high performing machine learning
models is the availability of sufficiently large datasets. This
work is motivated by applications arising in Software as a
Service (SaaS) companies where there exist numerous sim-
ilar yet disjoint datasets from multiple client companies. To
overcome the challenges of insufficient data without explic-
itly aggregating the clients’ datasets due to privacy concerns,
one solution is to collect more data for each individual client,
another is to privately aggregate information from models
trained on each client’s data. In this work, two approaches for
private model aggregation are proposed that enable the trans-
fer of knowledge from existing models trained on other com-
panies’ datasets to a new company with limited labeled data
while protecting each client company’s underlying individ-
ual sensitive information. The two proposed approaches are
based on state-of-the-art private learning algorithms: Differ-
entially Private Permutation-based Stochastic Gradient De-
scent and Approximate Minima Perturbation. We empirically
show that by leveraging differentially private techniques, we
can enable private model aggregation and augment data util-
ity while providing provable mathematical guarantees on pri-
vacy. The proposed methods thus provide significant business
value for SaaS companies and their clients, specifically as a
solution for the cold-start problem.
Introduction
The prevalence of personal and connected devices along
with the ubiquity of the Internet in our daily lives have led
to an explosion of data being collected on individuals. These
data are a treasure trove enabling services from personalized
shopping to personalized health-care. Access to more data is
a key factor in developing better and more accurate machine
learning models. While collecting more intra-company data
is one solution, another is to share data across companies.
Inter-company data aggregation can expand the data for all
participating companies in an accelerated way. However,
companies are not always willing to volunteer their data,
primarily due to privacy concerns for both the individuals
providing the data and the entities collecting, storing and ac-
tioning on these data (Dwork et al., 2017).
Bluecore is a Business-to-Business SaaS company that
collects on-site and off-line traffic data from E-commerce
∗Work done while at Bluecore, Inc.
†Work done while at Georgian Partners
companies to enable marketers to grow their customer base,
identify their best customers, and maximize their lifetime
value. This is done through machine learning models that
predict, for example, a customer’s lifetime value, their affin-
ity to products, and their propensity to engage with an email.
Each client’s data are typically stored in a silo separate from
the others. When training a model for a customer, only the
respective customer’s data are used. However, if Bluecore
were to combine its different datasets in a risk-free way,
it could augment the utility of its models for each of their
clients.
Differential privacy (DP) is a fast-growing field that pro-
vides provable guarantees on data privacy while maintaining
utility. Privacy guarantees garner the trust of individuals and
are key to enabling a greater level of trust and collaboration
amongst companies. We propose and evaluate two DP-based
frameworks to enable the training of machine learning mod-
els across various companies’ datasets. These approaches
provide the benefits of aggregation while ensuring that no
company can glean precise information on any individual
customer in another company’s dataset. The first framework
is based on the Differentially Private Permutation-based
Stochastic Gradient Descent (DPPSGD) algorithm (Wu et
al., 2017) and the second is based on the Approximate Min-
ima Perturbation (AMP) algorithm (Iyengar et al.); both ap-
ply to techniques with convex objective functions, such as
logistic regression (LR). This paper focuses on the aggre-
gation of LR for binary classification models as a starting
point, since LR is one of the most prevalently used algo-
rithms. We show that our DP framework using the DPPSGD
algorithm provides a 9.72% average lift in performance over
a non-aggregated baseline in a real-world cold-start setting
and an average lift of 4.85% using the AMP method.
Organization of the paper: We first present some back-
ground on differential privacy and then describe the two DP
methods employed (DPPSGD and AMP) with their imple-
mentation details. Subsequently, we cover the experimental
results obtained. They are followed by the business impact
of this work and we conclude with future investigation di-
rections.
Key contributions:
• A framework for improving model performance by aggre-
gating siloed data in a differentially private manner.
• A detailed description of the strongly convex DPPSGD
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algorithm with mini-batching that allows for faster con-
vergence without compromising on privacy, including a
derivation of the key loss function parameters.
• A full comparison of DPPSGD and AMP in a model ag-
gregation framework.
• Experimental results showing the benefit of DP aggrega-
tion in the case of a cold-start problem with limited data.
Problem Description
As data collection for Bluecore’s partners (clients) only be-
gins when they sign up for its services, it could take several
months before the models have the data needed for good
performance. While each partner may suffer from limited
data, enough data exist collectively across the partner-base
to build higher performing models. However, partners are
hesitant to have their data combined with others due to pri-
vacy concerns. Therefore, we set out to find a technical so-
lution that could allow for aggregation across partners while
preserving the privacy of each partner’s data.
One approach could be to build a model on each part-
ner’s data separately and then aggregate the models using an
ensemble approach. Unfortunately, this method would not
guarantee privacy as it has been shown that machine learning
models leak data. Barreno et al. (2010) show that models can
memorize patterns in the training data exposing specific data
points. Moreover, even in cases of only black-box access to
the model, model-membership inference attacks (Shokri et
al., 2017) can determine whether a data-point was used in
training, and model inversion attacks (Fredrikson, Jha, and
Ristenpart, 2015) can pinpoint the value of specific features
of a training data-point.
To address the above privacy issues we teamed up with
the impact team at Georgian Partners, one of our venture
capital investors. This paper presents the result of this col-
laboration which shows that DP can provide a viable ap-
proach for aggregating partner specific models while simul-
taneously guaranteeing that no one partner can learn spe-
cific information about an individual data-point in another
partner’s dataset. We also show that this differentially pri-
vate aggregation provides business value and can mitigate
the cold-start problem. Specifically, we focus on Bluecore’s
propensity to convert model, which is an LR model that es-
timates the probability that a customer will make a purchase
in the near future. We expect that these findings would ex-
tend to our other propensity models which also use LR.
Related Work
Data privacy has always been a primary concern for or-
ganizations and individuals. Masking an individual’s per-
sonally identifiable information is not enough: it has been
shown that 87% of Americans could be identified by us-
ing auxiliary information such as ZIP code, birthday, and
gender (Sweeney, 2000). In an effort to hinder identifica-
tion of individuals and private data, a major area of research
emerged that studies how to extract meaningful statistical
information from databases while preserving privacy. Re-
cently, Uber (Mohan et al., 2012; Johnson, Near, and Song)
and Google (Erlingsson, Pihur, and Korolova, 2014; Fanti,
Pihur, and Erlingsson, 2016) have released tools to query a
database in a private way.
There are two traditional techniques for preserving pri-
vacy: input and output perturbation. Input perturbation orig-
inated from survey techniques that inject some random noise
when a participant answers the survey, such as Random-
ized Response (Warner, 1965). In output perturbation, an
exact answer is first computed, then a random noise is in-
jected to the output answer (Reiss, 1984; Traub, Yemini, and
Woz´niakowski, 1984; Beck, 1980). However, these classi-
cal techniques often generate too much noise, rendering the
information extracting process impractical. For example, it
has been shown that, in some cases, unless the noise in-
jected to the database is so large that the database becomes
unusable, it could be recovered in polynomial time by an
adversary (Dinur and Nissim, 2003). Following this work,
Dwork et al. (2006) suggested calibrating the noise to the
sensitivity of the query function to keep meaningful sta-
tistical information. This study coined a new definition of
privacy, named Differential Privacy, which is the definition
used in this work. Given two neighboring databases D and
D′ which differ in only one data entry and for all events
E ∈ Range(A), a non-interactive randomized algorithm A
is said to be (, δ)-differentially private if:
Pr[A(D) ∈ E] ≤ ePr[A(D′) ∈ E] + δ (1)
In particular, if δ = 0, -differentially private is used in-
stead. By analyzing the sensitivity of the query functions and
injecting noise following a Laplace distribution, Dwork et
al. (2006) showed that -differential privacy can be achieved
with much less noise than traditional approaches. For a sur-
vey of differential privacy based querying techniques we re-
fer the reader to Dwork (2008).
There is, however, a drawback to these private querying
techniques: the number of queries that can be made to the
database is limited by a privacy budget as discussed in Fried-
man and Schuster (2010). This translates to differentially
private models where each query to the model is differen-
tially private, but the model parameters themselves are not.
In these cases, each query leaks a small amount of infor-
mation about the original data, and while a small number of
queries may not constitute a significant leakage, a large num-
ber of queries may invalidate any meaningful privacy guar-
antees. To conquer the restrictions of private queries, model
differential privacy has gained popularity as it does not im-
pose any privacy budget limitations. The learning mecha-
nism is treated as one query to the database, allowing the
model to subsequently be used an unlimited number of times
to make predictions (Chaudhuri, Monteleoni, and Sarwate,
2011; Bassily, Smith, and Thakurta, 2014).
Chaudhuri and Monteleoni (2009) introduced a differen-
tially private LR model by analyzing the sensitivity of a
regularized logistic loss and perturbing the learned weights
with noise that is inversely proportional to the bound on the
sensitivity. Recent work (Wu et al., 2017) proposed a new
technique named Differentially Private Permutation-based
Stochastic Gradient Descent (DPPSGD) that also injects
noise on the model output weights. The study provides a new
analysis on sensitivity and allows for injecting less noise
and faster convergence. Performance is therefore preserved
while strong privacy is guaranteed. The DPPSGD algorithm
is however limited to models with convex or strongly-convex
objective functions. In parallel, methods that inject noise
during the optimization process emerged. Song, Chaudhuri,
and Sarwate (2013) proposed to add noise at each update of
the gradient descent, but this created high variation in the
training process. In a later version, Abadi et al. (2016) de-
rived tighter privacy bounds for a similar gradient perturba-
tion method. Another technique consists in perturbing the
objective function itself, and output the model parameters
that minimize the transformed loss, as in Chaudhuri, Mon-
teleoni, and Sarwate (2011). Unfortunately, privacy guaran-
tees only hold when the algorithm outputs the exact minima
of the noisy objective, which can be impracticable to find
in some cases. More recent work by Iyengar et al. presents
a novel algorithm applicable to any convex loss, Approxi-
mate Minima Perturbation (AMP), that can provide privacy
and utility guarantees even when the released model is not
necessarily the exact minima of the perturbed objective.
Methodologies
As described in previous sections, the goal is to enable trans-
fer learning through model aggregation. In order to protect
the individual’s privacy, the models must be trained in a pri-
vate way. Selecting which private approach to use largely
depends on the nature of the problem and the availabil-
ity of data. After exploring different methods to build dif-
ferentially private machine learning models, we identified
DPPSGD (Wu et al., 2017) and AMP (Iyengar et al.) as the
best approaches for our use-case of solving the cold-start
problem, where we have few labeled data. In this section,
we provide a detailed description of the DPPSGD LR ap-
proach that employs mini batches, and an overview of the
AMP approach.
Notation: Throughout this paper, we will be using ||x|| to
indicate the l2-norm. Vectors will be written in boldface and
sets in calligraphic type. A list of all parameters used for
both algorithms is provided in Table 1.
DPPSGD
In the DPPSGD algorithm (Wu et al., 2017), stochastic gra-
dient descent (SGD) is treated as a black box and, Laplace
noise is only added to the model output at the end of the op-
timization process. The authors provide a novel analysis of
the convergence of the permutation-based SGD and a tighter
bound on the L2-sensitivity of the algorithm. The authors
showed that little noise is needed to achieve reasonable pri-
vacy guarantees. The key advantages of using the DPPSGD
algorithm are that its implementation is simple and that it re-
lies on SGD, which is a generic optimization technique that
can be applied to other convex optimization based machine
learning techniques.
Strongly Convex DPPSGD Algorithm Wu et al. indicate
that using mini-batching can improve sensitivity bounds by
the batch size b and thus effectively lowering the amount
of noise to be injected (Wu et al., 2017). Thus, we imple-
ment the strongly convex version of the DPPSGD algorithm
Table 1: List of parameters.
Parameter Description
N Number of partners considered
S Training set
m Size of training set S
d Dimension of training set S
Loss function
λ l2-regularization parameter
C Loss parameter
L Lipschitz constant
β Smoothness
∆2 L2-sensitivity
γ Strong convexity parameter
DPPSGD
ηt Learning rate at iteration t
b Batch size
W Hypothesis space
R Radius of the hypothesis space W
AMP
h Bound on norm of the loss’s gradient
Privacy
, δ Privacy parameters
with mini-batching throughout this paper and we will sim-
ply refer to this algorithm as DPPSGD going forward. Our
approach necessitates a custom implementation of LR since
DPPSGD not only demands a model output perturbation
but also two crucial modifications in the training process
to ensure convergence. The learning rate ηt must be set to
min
(
1
β ,
1
γt
)
at each iteration t and the hypothesis space W ,
within which lives the weights vector w, is constrained to a
ball of radius R. Therefore, at the end of each iteration, we
must compute the l2-norm of the weights ||w||, and project
w down to the R-ball if ||w|| > R. After all iterations have
finished, regardless of the size of ||w||, w is projected to the
R-ball. By doing so, ||w|| is normalized to R and noise will
have less impact on w when R is relatively large.
We have identified two preconditions that must be met in
order to implement the strongly convex DPPSGD:
1. the loss function must be γ-strongly convex for all w
2. all data-points xi must be scaled such that ||xi|| ≤ 1.
The l2-regularized sigmoid binary cross-entropy loss
L(w, x), presented in equation (2) fulfills the first condition
(Grant, Boyd, and Ye, 2008):
L(w, x) =− C 1
N
N∑
i=0
[yi ln (yˆi) + (1− yi) ln (1− yˆi)]
+
λ
2
||w||2 (2)
where, yˆi =
1
1 + e−wT xi
The yi ∈ {0, 1} represent the records’ labels. We discuss
in detail how to achieve precondition 2 in the Experimental
Results section.
There are three main parameters specific to the objective
function L(w, x) which can be derived: L, a tight bound
on ||∇L(w, x)||, β, a tight bound on ||H(L(w, x))||, and
γ. Given the loss function L(w, x), it is clear that γ = λ.
The detailed derivation of L and β is shown below. For
σ(x) = 11+e−x , since σ(x)
′ = σ(x) · (1 − σ(x)), and us-
ing the chain rule, we get
yˆ′i = yˆi · (1− yˆi) · xi
∇L(w, x) = −C 1
N
N∑
i=0
[
yi
yˆi
− 1− yi
1− yˆi
]
yˆ′i + λw
= C
1
N
N∑
i=0
[
yˆi − yi
yˆi(1− yˆi)
]
yˆi(1− yˆi)(xi) + λw
= C
1
N
N∑
i=0
[yˆi − yi] (xi) + λw
Since ∀i, 0 ≤ yˆi ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1
∇L(w) ≤ C 1
N
N∑
i=0
[1] · (xi) + λw = C · (xi) + λw
Then, since ∀i||xi|| ≤ 1 and ||w|| ≤ R,
||∇L(w, x)|| ≤ C||xi||+ λ||w|| ≤ C + λR (3)
Therefore, we setL toC+λR. We now present the deriva-
tion for β.
∇2L(w, x) = C 1
N
N∑
i=0
[yˆi · (1− yˆi) · (−xi)− yi] · (xi) + λ
≤ C 1
N
N∑
i=0
[1] · (xi) + λ = C · (xi) + λ (4)
Then, ||∇2L(w)|| ≤ C||xi||+ λ ≤ C + λ (5)
Therefore, we set β to be C + λ. All other parameters are
hyper parameters that can be tuned privately. The specifics
will be discussed in the Experimental Results section.
AMP
The other differentially private model that we consider is
the AMP algorithm (Iyengar et al.). The AMP algorithm
is a mix of objective perturbation and output perturbation.
First, the objective function is perturbed and takes the form
L˜(w, x) = L(w, x) + 〈b1,w〉, where b1 is a Gaussian noise
term. To overcome the challenge of finding the exact min-
ima, the AMP algorithm allows for an approximation: the al-
gorithm optimizes over the perturbed objective function and
stops when the norm of the gradient of the perturbed objec-
tive, ∇L˜(wapprox, x) is within a pre-determined threshold
h. The algorithm then releases wapprox + b2, where b2 is
another random variable drawn from a Gaussian distribution
with a variance that is linearly dependent on the threshold h.
In the AMP algorithm, the (, δ) privacy budget is split
into two, (obj , δobj) and (out, δout). (obj , δobj) is used to
create the Gaussian noise that is added to the objective func-
tion while (out, δout) is use to compute the Gaussian noise
that is added to the model output. The privacy and utility
guarantees are analyzed thoroughly in Iyengar et al., where
pseudo-code for the algorithm can also be found. Further-
more, the loss function used is the same as in equation (2)
but C is not used (i.e. C = 1) and λ is set as required by the
privacy guarantees of the paper.
Experimental Results
In this section, we first describe the real-world datasets used
for all experimentation and data pre-processing procedures.
Next, we present the experimental design and results of three
different experiments using both DPPSGD and AMP.
Real-world Datasets
The datasets used for the experiments capture customer-
website interactions from 38 of Bluecore’s retail partners;
all from the same business vertical. For each partner, we ex-
tract customer data in the same manner as for the model cur-
rently live in production. Each customer is represented by 19
engineered features that capture their browse and purchase
behavior. Each record is labeled as 1 if a purchase occurred
in the subsequent 15 days, 0 otherwise. For each partner, we
obtain one “ramped-up” dataset (size shown in Figure 5) that
contains one year worth of customer records. To simulate
a cold start setting, we also obtain one “cold-start” dataset
(size shown in Figure 4), which only includes records that
were collected in the last month. To allow for a consistent
comparison between the models built on “ramped-up” and
“cold-start” datasets, the features extracted were engineered
in a time-agnostic manner.
Private vs Public Data: When training differentially private
models, the data used fall into two categories: private or pub-
lic. Private data are deemed sensitive, and the DP model is
designed to protect them. Public data are widely available or
not sensitive and therefore the DP model does not need to
protect them: they are commonly used for parameter tuning,
to help bypass information leakage, or in this case, to train
the aggregate model. In this paper, when building an aggre-
gate model for a given target partner, that partner’s own pro-
prietary data do not pose any privacy restrictions; hence they
are public data with regards to the target partner. However,
data from other companies that the target company seeks to
leverage are considered private.
Data Preprocessing
Both the DPPSGD and AMP approaches require that the loss
have a L2-Lipschitz constant, L. To achieve this, we bound
the feature vectors x including the bias term by 1. This must
be done in a private manner, and we cannot leverage other
partner’s datasets to normalize the target partner’s. In order
to achieve normalization independently from other samples,
we first pick a threshold t that bounds the l2-norm of each
data-point, ||xi||, such that all data-points with ||xi|| > t are
considered as outliers and discarded. We add the bias term
with value v to each data-point xi and the new xi vector is
denoted by x¯i. All values are divided by
√
t + v to achieve
||x¯i|| ≤ 1. The logic is as follows: given that
∑
(x2i ) ≤ t,
||x¯i|| =
√√√√∑[( xi√
t+ v
)2]
+
(
v√
t+ v
)2
≤ 1√
t+ v
(√∑
(x2i ) +
√
v2
)
=
√
t+ v√
t+ v
= 1 (6)
Experimental Design
Using each partner’s respective training datasets, we train a
differentially private LR classifier for both “ramped-up” and
“cold-start” datasets using either the DPPSGD or the AMP
algorithm. Next, for each partner, referred to as the target
partner, an ensemble model is trained as follows:
1. we feed the target partner’s training data-points xi into all
of the partner-specific private models and get all of their
predictions {yˆ(k)i }k=0..N
2. we train a gradient boosting classifier using the
{yˆ(k)i }k=0..N as inputs and the true labels yi as targets.
The aggregation framework is shown in Figure 1. Each
line type (full, dash, point-dash) represents the model train-
ing and aggregation process for different target partners.
Partner 1
Partner 2
Partner 3
DP Logistic 
Regression
DP Logistic 
Regression
DP Logistic 
Regression
Predict P1
Predict P2
Predict P3
Predict P1
Predict P2
Predict P3
Predict P1
Predict P2
Predict P3
XG-Boost 
Aggregate 
Model P1
XG-Boost 
Aggregate 
Model P2
XG-Boost 
Aggregate 
Model P3
Figure 1: Framework for aggregation of private models.
DPPSGD When training differentially private models, pa-
rameter tuning must be done privately. There exist several
differentially private parameter tuning algorithms (Chaud-
huri, Monteleoni, and Sarwate, 2011; Wu et al., 2017), how-
ever in our case, we use the target partner’s data (which
are considered as “public” data) to tune the parameters. We
find the best performing parameters using the target part-
ner’s data and apply them to other partners’ model training
parameters. We repeat the same process for each partner in
turn. The free parameters that we can tune for DPPSGD are
b, λ, C and R. Since C and λ have proportionally inverse
effects, we choose to fix λ at a standard value that ensures
numerical stability and faster convergence during the gra-
dient descent and vary C. The batch size b and R are set as
suggested in Wu et al. (2017). The values fixed/spanned dur-
ing parameter tuning are summarized in table 2, along with
the privacy parameters.
Table 2: DPPSGD parameter values.
Parameter Value Assigned
λ 0.001
C 5, 10, 50, 100, 500
b max(16, m100 )
R 1λ
 0.01
AMP For the AMP algorithm, the free parameters are L,
h and the privacy parameters. We follow the guidelines out-
lined in Iyengar et al. for setting all of them, and their values
are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: AMP parameter values.
Parameter Value Assigned
L 1
h 1m2
 0.01
δ 1m2
obj , out 0.99, 0.01
δobj , δout 0.99δ, 0.01δ
Ensemble Model We use the XGBClassifier from the tree
gradient boosting (XGBoost) package (Chen and Guestrin,
2016) to train the aggregated super-classifier with default pa-
rameter settings.
Performance Measure We evaluate the learned models
on each partner’s test set. As an evaluation measure, we use
the area under the ROC curve (AUC).
Experimental Setup Both differentially private algo-
rithms and the ensemble model are implemented following
the algorithms outlined in the pseudo-codes in Wu et al.
(2017) and Iyengar et al., and are written in Python 3.6. The
implementation of DPPSGD uses the MXNet (Chen et al.,
2015) package while AMP is implemented using the open
source package that is provided with the paper (Iyengar et
al.) and which employs SciPy’s minimize procedure and
BGFS solver.
Summary of Experiments
Non-private Baseline For each partner, we train a non-
private and unperturbed model on the respective “cold-start”
dataset as a baseline for comparison. We also train a non-
private and unperturbed model on the respective “ramped-
up” dataset. The non-private models are trained with SGD
using the MXNet package.
Experiment 1: Varying  Prior to the aggregation, we
conducted an investigation on the impact of  on the LR per-
formance. For each partner’s “cold-start” dataset, we aver-
aged the performance of models trained using the data is-
sued from 10 different random train/test splits, in order to
deal with randomness induced by data partitioning. Addi-
tionally, for each epsilon, we sampled the noise vector 100
times before adding it to the model weights, in order to aver-
age out randomness induced in the noise sampling process.
Figure 2 shows the quartiles of AUC across all partners on
individual DPPSGD and AMP private models while varying
. The box labeled as no noise represents the non-private,
unperturbed model, i.e., our baseline. As shown in Figure 2
for DPPSGD, there is a clear trend where smaller , which
corresponds to stronger privacy guarantees, yields less accu-
rate learners. As expected, for extremely high levels of noise
( = 1e−6), the performance is close to that of a random
classifier. As the amplitude of the noise added decreases, the
performance gets closer and closer to the “true” performance
of the model, i.e. that of the unperturbed model. For AMP,
the variance in performance is higher than for DPPSGD at
equally high levels of noise. AMP is inherently more prone
to variance, as noise is also added to the objective function.
We also note that AMP performs poorly even for a higher
privacy budget ( = 0.4).
0.5
0.6
0.7
AU
C
DPPSGD
1e
-06
0.0
00
1
0.0
00
5
0.0
01
0.0
05 0.0
1
0.0
2
0.0
5 0.1 0.2 0.4
no
 no
ise
Epsilon
0.5
0.6
0.7
AU
C
AMP
Figure 2: The quartiles of AUC across all partners on indi-
vidual private models with varying values of .
Based on our business requirements and the model per-
formance results, we have picked  = 0.01 as the privacy
parameter for the rest of our experiments. In Figure 3, we
display for each partner the average AUC of the “cold-start”
private and non-private models, dealing with randomness in
data splitting and noise sampling as above. Unsurprisingly,
the baseline almost always outperforms the noisy model, ex-
cept in some cases for DPPSGD where we have similar per-
formance (for instance partner 1, 8 or 12). For AMP, the per-
formance generally remains close to that of a random classi-
fier and does slightly better for some partners (4, 7, 22 or 24
for instance).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
Partners
0.2
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non-private
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Figure 3: AUC comparison of non-private, DPPSGD, and
AMP models per partner ( = 0.01).
Experiment 2: Aggregation We then compute the AUC
across all partners for the aggregated private models. The
results are illustrated in Figure 4. The first subplot displays
the relative AUC lift of the “cold-start” private target part-
ner’s model, aggregated with the other partners’ “ramped-
up” models over the non-private baseline (computed via a
model trained non-privately using a “cold-start” dataset).
This is the main result of this study as it shows the utility
of aggregation in our specific use case: augmenting a “cold-
start” partner’s performance with “ramped-up” partners. On
average, the aggregation frameworks built with private mod-
els using DPPSGD and AMP provide a lift of 9.72% and
4.85%, respectively. These results highlight the benefits of
aggregation (especially for AMP): while the noise injection
led to a sometimes significant degradation in performance
on an individual partner level (Figure 3), the aggregation
provided a lift that counter-balanced it. The second subplot
compares the same aggregated performance than above but
to a “ramped-up” non-private baseline. The aim is to see
how well the aggregation can do compared to the perfor-
mance that a partner can hope for once fully “ramped-up”.
The DPPSGD aggregation framework provides an average
lift of 8.92% while the AMP aggregation framework pro-
vides an average lift of 3.69%. The third subplot represents
the size of the “cold-start” training set. After aggregation and
for both methods, most partners benefit from a lift over the
“cold-start” baseline. For DPPSGD (resp. AMP), only part-
ners 7, 19 and 25 (resp. 2, 7, 14, 19, 25 and 31) take a hit in
performance. We see that most significant lifts benefit small-
sized partners (e.g. 5, 9 and 29 for DPPSGD; 0, 9 and 29 for
AMP) but also some large ones (e.g. 30 for both). This very
last remark, along with the results of the comparison with
the “ramped-up” baseline highlight that data quantity is not
the only driver of model performance. The quality of the
transfer learning may also lie in the diversity of the different
datasets’ distributions.
Additionally, we ran the aggregation in the case where the
target partner also uses the “ramped-up” dataset to highlight
the benefits of aggregation even in non-cold-start scenarios.
Figure 5 shows the relative lift in AUC of aggregation using
only “ramped-up” models over the “ramped-up” non-private
baseline. Once again, we see that aggregation benefits most
partners. Here, DPPSGD (resp. AMP) yields an average lift
of 8.16% (resp. 7.38%).
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Figure 4: Relative per partner AUC lift for “cold-start” target
partner ( = 0.01).
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Figure 5: Relative per partner AUC lift for “ramped-up” tar-
get partner ( = 0.01).
Experiment 3: Varying Number of Partners Finally, we
conducted a study on the impact of the number of partners
on performance. In order to do that, we sampled a 100 times
a subset of k partners for k ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35}, ran
for each subsample of partners the aggregation of the pri-
vate models of the selected partners and reported the aver-
age AUC lift over the non-private baseline. The results are
shown on Figure 6. As we add more partners, the variance
in performance decreases but the mean remains more or less
stable. This indicates that aggregation can provide a benefit
even when a small number of datasets is available. How-
ever, the variance also shows that the effect of each dataset
on the target partner’s performance could be large. As more
and more datasets are aggregated the relative influence of
each one of them diminishes, therefore ensuring that no one
dataset drives all of the improvement in performance.
Business Impact and Future Work
At Bluecore, the cold-start problem directly affects the per-
formance of our models for partners that have recently
signed up. This leads to either deploying under-performing
models for partners eager to use them or delaying model-
deployment until a critical mass of data is collected. The ap-
proach presented in this paper provides us with the ability to
bridge, in a differentially private manner, the gaps between
our clients’ siloed data, and in turn enables us to provide
better models sooner. Consequently, this will directly drive
a higher return on investment for our partners and more rev-
enue for Bluecore.
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Figure 6: Relative AUC lift over the non-private baseline
with varying numbers of aggregation models ( = 0.01).
This paper has shown marked improvement for our
propensity to convert model. Future work will study whether
this improvement will also manifest itself in the other LR
based models such as the models predicting propensity to
open, click, and unsubscribe. Additionally, we employ a
wide array of algorithms beyond LR that do not have strong
convex loss objective functions. For those, we plan to ex-
plore DP aggregation through private aggregation of teacher
ensembles (Papernot et al., 2018; Abadi et al., 2016).
Conclusion
Differential privacy provides privacy guarantees for individ-
uals while enabling insights at the entire population level.
This leads individuals to more willingly share their data in
return for improved machine learning products and insights.
Furthermore, in SaaS companies that collect and store client
companies’ data in a siloed manner, differential privacy can
also encourage entities or companies with similar data to
share information amongst each other.
We proposed a framework for private model aggregation
using differential privacy. We analyzed the framework with
two different private model generation algorithms: DPPSGD
and AMP. Through extensive experimentation, we observed
that in a cold-start setting our framework can provide an av-
erage model performance lift of 9.72% using DPPSGD and
4.85% using AMP. Furthermore, our results show that ag-
gregation can even benefit in a fully-ramped up setting. We
also observed that as the number of client datasets aggre-
gated increases, the contribution of each dataset to the gains
achieved through aggregation is reduced.
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